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It may seem a far cry from Kant to Professor Stevenson … 
—R. M. Hare, The Language of  Morals 
 
HEN WE MAKE ETHICAL JUDGMENTS, we invoke a kind 
of  authority or objectivity. When we insist, for example, that peo-
ple ought not to harm others just for fun, we are not merely claim-
ing that this is so according to some standard or other, but rather that it is so ac-
cording to authoritative or normative standards. 
A familiar worry about our practice of  making ethical judgments is that 
this invocation of  normative authority somehow always fails. The worry can 
arise in a number of  different forms. Its most common form was perhaps 
best expressed by John Mackie in the first chapter of  Ethics: Inventing Right and 
Wrong (1977). There Mackie supposes that when we judge that people ought 
not to harm others just for fun, we believe that there is an authoritative stand-
ard according to which this is so. Mackie then argues that this belief  is always 
mistaken: “[A]lthough most people in making moral judgments implicitly 
claim, among other things, to be pointing to something objectively prescrip-
tive, these claims are all false.”1 In other words, although our ethical judg-
ments presuppose that authoritative standards or objective values are some-
how sewn into the fabric of  the world, in fact the world contains nothing so 
“queer.”2 Consequently, ethics is not the secure and successful practice it ap-
pears to be. Like astrology and witchcraft, ethics – Mackie concludes – turns 
out to be grounded in nothing more than an illusion. 
Over the years, philosophers have attempted to deflect Mackie’s broad-
side in various ways. Many of  these philosophers opt for some form of  real-
ism. Nonnaturalists acknowledge that normative authority is queer but maintain 
that the fabric of  the world contains it nonetheless. These philosophers face 
familiar metaphysical and epistemological worries. Naturalists contend that 
objective authority is not queer at all and is instead identical or reducible to 
some natural property. These philosophers avoid the metaphysical and epis-
temological problems that plague nonnaturalists but instead invite the objec-
tion that they have changed the subject from ethics to something else. They 
face the formidable challenge of  showing that the natural property they have 
identified really is the property we mean to invoke when we make ethical 
judgments. 
As realists, both naturalists and nonnaturalists accept Mackie’s account 
of  the shape and scope of  our ethical practices. They both acknowledge that 
we can vindicate those practices only by showing that objective values or au-
thoritative standards really are built into the fabric of  the world. Yet if  the 
                                                     
1 Mackie (1977: 35). 
2 Ibid., 38. 
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course of  metaethics over the past hundred years tells us anything, it tells us 
that this is no easy task. Ethics and the fabric of  the world do not seem like a 
very good fit for one another. 
Bernard Williams (1995), in his discussion of  Mackie’s book, outlines a 
strategy for securing the objectivity of  ethics – and thus for vindicating our 
ethical practices – that does away with the problematic supposition shared by 
Mackie and his realist critics: 
 
Consider another picture of  what it would be for a demand to be “objec-
tively valid.” It is Kant’s own picture. According to this, a demand will be 
inescapable in the required sense if  it is one that a rational agent must ac-
cept if  he is to be a rational agent. It is, to use one of  Kant’s favorite met-
aphors, self-addressed by any rational agent. Kant was wrong, in my view, in 
supposing that the fundamental demands of  morality were objective in 
this sense, but that is not the immediate point, which is that the concep-
tion deploys an intelligible and adequate sense of  objectivity. It seems to 
have little to do with those demands being a part of  the fabric of  the 
world; or, at any rate, they will be no more or less so than the demands of  
logic – which was, of  course, part of  Kant’s point.3 
 
On the Kantian view sketched by Williams, we need not posit an ethical 
swatch of  the fabric of  reality in order to account for the objectivity of  eth-
ics. Ethical judgments correctly invoke normative authority not by corre-
sponding to or picking out anything in the world, but rather by expressing 
demands or commitments that are, from the practical point of  view, inescapa-
ble. 
This Kantian strategy has proved quite popular in recent years.4 Much 
of  its allure is due to its promise to soothe Mackie-style worries about our 
ethical practices while avoiding the metaphysical, epistemological and seman-
tic controversies surrounding realism. In fact, as Stephen Darwall, Allan 
Gibbard and Peter Railton observe in their survey of  fin de siècle ethics, many 
philosophers drawn to the Kantian strategy hope to bypass the metaphysics, 
epistemology and semantics of  normative discourse altogether. They aim “to 
sidestep traditional metaethics,” or even to “render traditional metaethics ob-
solete.”5 These Kantians tend to believe that standard metanormative theo-
ries – theories such as expressivism, as well as the nonnaturalist and naturalist 
varieties of  realism mentioned above – somehow miss what is interesting or 
                                                     
3 Williams (1995: 174-75). 
4 What I am calling “the Kantian strategy” actually goes by many names, including constructiv-
ism (Korsgaard (2008); Street (2008)), constitutivism (Coleman (unpublished manuscript); Fer-
rero (2009)) and ethical rationalism (Setiya (2007)). Each of  these labels is used in a number of  
ways, however, and not all of  these uses are compatible with the strategy outlined by Wil-
liams. In order to avoid ambiguity, I shall continue to refer to the view that is our subject 
simply as the “Kantian strategy.” 
5 Darwall, Gibbard and Railton (1992: 142, 143). 
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important about ethics, and they offer their approach as an alternative to 
such familiar but “boring” views.6 
In this paper, I argue that the Kantian strategy for securing the objectivi-
ty of  ethics cannot make good on this promise: it cannot vindicate our ethi-
cal practices while sidestepping traditional metaethics. Put another way, the 
Kantian strategy is not an alternative to familiar metanormative theories; the 
sense of  objectivity which it deploys can be, to borrow Williams’ word, “ade-
quate” only with the support of  a metaethic. 
In section 1, I describe the Kantian strategy in greater detail, drawing on 
the work of  some of  its more well-known proponents. I also identify a po-
tentially crippling lacuna in the strategy and argue that the Kantians cannot 
fill this lacuna without relying on metanormative assumptions. I do not con-
clude that we should therefore abandon the Kantian approach, however. In-
stead I introduce two versions of  the Kantian strategy which appeal explicitly 
to metanormative premises: Kantian expressivism (in section 2) and Kantian re-
ductionism (in section 3). I argue that the former avoids the potentially crip-
pling lacuna and that the latter can easily bridge it. The Kantian strategy can 
succeed, then, but not without metanormative assistance. Finally (in section 
4), I consider and reject the possibility that the Kantian strategy involves a 
metaethic of  its own, distinct from both expressivism and reductionism. 
 
1. The Kantian Strategy 
 
In The Sources of  Normativity, Christine Korsgaard (1996) claims that the au-
thority or normativity to which an agent’s ethical judgments appeal is to be 
found “in the agent’s own will, in particular in the fact that the laws of  mo-
rality are the laws of  the agent’s own will and that its claims are ones she is 
prepared to make on herself.”7 The laws of  morality bind us, in other words, 
because they consist of  demands to which we are already committed: they 
are demands we make on ourselves. Moreover, their authority is objective be-
cause we cannot help but make these demands; they are “inescapable.” 8 As 
Korsgaard sometimes puts it, it is constitutive of  agency that we value our-
selves as agents: “[B]eing human requires it.”9 And since “you must value 
your own humanity if  you are to act at all,” Korsgaard concludes, “human 
beings are valuable.”10 
Here we can see the Kantian strategy outlined by Williams at work. 
Korsgaard acknowledges that Mackie-style worries about the validity of  our 
ethical practices might lead us to wonder whether “obligations really exist.”11 
                                                     
6 Korsgaard (2008: 325, n. 49). 
7 Korsgaard (1996: 19). 
8 Korsgaard (1996: 130). 
9 Korsgaard (1996: 121). 
10 Korsgaard (1996: 123). 
11 Korsgaard (1996: 38). 
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And she argues that a realist account of  those practices – an account accord-
ing to which normative authority is somehow sewn into the fabric of  the 
world – cannot allay such worries. In lieu of  realism, Korsgaard offers what 
she describes as a Kantian account of  the sources of  normativity. According 
to this Kantian theory, we should respond to skeptical doubts about the de-
mands of  morality not by digging in our heels and insisting, as the realist 
does, that obligations really do exist, but rather by showing that those de-
mands are inescapable. 
The Kantian strategy sketched by Williams also features prominently in 
the recent work of  J. David Velleman. According to Velleman, demands are 
inescapable (and hence objective) by being related to the constitutive aim of  
action. The notion of  a constitutive aim of  action is the notion of  “an aim 
with respect to which behavior must be somehow regulated in order to quali-
fy as action.”12 It is, in other words, the idea of  a motive or drive that “sets 
you to reasoning in a way that makes you autonomous, constituting you as an 
agent.”13 Drawing on his work in the philosophy of  action, Velleman con-
tends that the constitutive aim of  agency is intelligibility. He then argues that 
this aim generates a standard of  correctness for action – a standard that is 
objectively valid in virtue of  being “constitutively inescapable” for any crea-
ture asking practical questions about what to do.14 Put another way, the con-
stitutive aim of  action gives rise to demands to which any agent is subject 
merely in virtue of  being an agent. These demands are sewn into the practi-
cal point of  view, and “anyone to whom they are addressed must already oc-
cupy that point of  view and must therefore accept whatever demands are 
woven into it.”15 And therein, Velleman urges – appealing explicitly to Wil-
liams’ Kantian proposal – lies their authority or normativity: “[P]ractical 
thoughts can be objectively valid by being inescapable.”16 
For both Velleman and Korsgaard, the Kantian strategy culminates in a 
straightforwardly normative conclusion. Korsgaard arrives at the verdict that 
human beings are valuable, Velleman at the claim that “[action’s] criterion of  
correctness is intelligibility.”17 It is not clear, though, how this final stage of  
the Kantian strategy – the move from inescapability to normativity – is sup-
posed to work. That is, it is not clear how we are supposed to derive norma-
tive conclusions about what is actually valuable or about what makes actions 
correct merely from premises about what we inescapably value or desire. 
Korsgaard takes the inference to be obvious: “We find ourselves to be valua-
ble. Therefore, of  course, we are valuable.”18 But it is not obvious at all; the 
suggestion that we necessarily value our own humanity at least appears to be 
                                                     
12 Velleman (2004: 234). 
13 Velleman (2009: 137). 
14 Ibid. 
15 Velleman (2009: 116). 
16 Ibid. 
17 Velleman (2009: 134). 
18 Korsgaard (1996: 124) (emphasis added). 
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perfectly consistent with the possibility that humanity is not in fact valuable. 
The most that follows obviously from the inescapability of  some commit-
ment or aim is that normative reasoning must always proceed from shared 
premises. But the fact that normative reasoning must always begin with 
shared premises does not entail that those premises are the correct ones from 
which to reason. If  we are worried – as Mackie was – that our ethical practic-
es are not all they are cracked up to be, it is not clear why the knowledge that 
certain values or commitments are inescapable should comfort us. Our hope 
to vindicate ethics consists of  more than the desire to know that we are all 
on the same page; we also want to be assured that we are on the right page. 
And it is not at all clear how we could ever be assured of  this simply by ap-
pealing to the inescapability of  some commitment or aim. There thus ap-
pears to be a lacuna in the Kantian strategy. 
To see this lacuna most clearly, consider a version of  the Kantian strate-
gy according to which what is inescapable for agents is some normative belief 
– say, the belief  that we ought to respect one another’s humanity. Would 
knowing that this normative belief  is inescapable provide us with any reason to 
conclude that it is correct? Would such knowledge help to allay concerns about 
the objective validity of  our practice of  judging that we ought to respect one 
another’s humanity? I cannot see how it would, any more than I can see how 
learning about the inescapability of  some belief  regarding the influence of  
celestial bodies would assure us of  the objective validity of  some form of  
astrology. For the standard of  correctness for belief  is truth, and showing that 
a belief  is inescapable does not in any way establish that it is true. That we all 
believe that p is perfectly and obviously consistent with p’s being false, for 
there is always the possibility that we are victims of  some sort of  collective 
delusion. Adding that the belief  in question is inescapable – that we all have 
this belief  merely because we are agents – if  anything only strengthens the 
suspicion that we have all been duped. As Williams James (1948) observed, it 
seems rather improbable that the truth should line up so conveniently with 
our needs and abilities: “In the great boarding-house of  nature, the cakes and 
the butter and the syrup seldom come out so even and leave the plates so 
clean. Indeed, we should view them with scientific suspicion if  they did.”19 
Return now to the Kantian strategy as it is pursued by Korsgaard and 
Velleman, where what is inescapable is not a belief  but rather some practical 
attitude – a commitment or aim. It is not clear how shifting from an inescap-
able doxastic attitude to an inescapable practical one makes matters any better 
vis-à-vis worries about the validity of  our ethical practices. That we are all 
necessarily committed to respecting one another’s humanity seems to be per-
fectly consistent with its not being the case that we ought to respect one an-
other’s humanity. We might, in other words, be victims of  a collective “prac-
tical” delusion, helplessly devoted to pursuing something which actually 
ought not to be pursued. As it stands, then, the Kantian strategy seems to 
                                                     
19 James (1948: 103). 
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provide us with no reason to rule out the possibility that the correct or valid 
practical commitments are different from the commitments which are ines-
capable – or even to rule out the possibility that there are no correct or valid 
practical commitments at all. The strategy therefore appears to be incom-
plete. It is difficult to see how premises about the inescapability of  some atti-
tude could, by themselves, entail any normative conclusions. 
Perhaps such premises are not meant to work by themselves, though. A 
natural way to augment them would be with some metaethics. We might, for 
example, be tempted to interpret Korsgaard and Velleman as relying on an 
unarticulated account of  the semantics of  normative judgments according to 
which the truth conditions of  such judgments are linked to facts about ines-
capability. Such an account certainly looks like the sort of  thing that could fill 
the lacuna in their Kantian approach and take us from premises about ines-
capability to normative conclusions. Alternatively, we might think of  
Korsgaard and Velleman as embracing an expressivist theory of  normative 
judgments according to which normative judgments are essentially practical, 
expressing conative states such as plans or desires rather than cognitive states 
like belief. 
I shall have more to say about such metanormative possibilities below. 
Here let me simply observe that attributing such familiar metanormative the-
ories to Korsgaard and Velleman is not the most natural way to interpret 
them, given that both evince little interest in metanormative questions and 
occasionally even show some disdain for metaethics, at least as it is standardly 
practiced. Korsgaard, for instance, describes her view as a “genuine alterna-
tive” to traditional metanormative theories – one that “stands behind the de-
bate between cognitivists and noncognitivists.”20 Given that the distinction 
between cognitivism and noncognitivism is generally regarded to be exhaus-
tive with respect to metanormative theories, it is reasonable to infer from this 
description that Korsgaard intends to eschew metaethics. Velleman, mean-
while, advertises his Kantian approach as one that can ground the objective 
validity of  ethics while avoiding the metanormative entanglements of  real-
ism. “We don’t need” to posit an ethical pocket in the fabric of  the world in 
order to capture the normative authority of  certain demands: these demands 
are “objectively valid [simply] by being inescapable, in the sense that any 
agent must accept them.”21 Yet Velleman does not frame his theory as a 
metanormative alternative to realism. Instead, he claims to be offering an al-
ternative to metaethics in general, acknowledging that his account of  the 
foundations of  ethics “may strike some philosophers as no metaethics at 
all.”22 This should not be surprising, given that he has “doubts about the way 
metaethics is generally practiced”: “Analyzing the semantics, metaphysics, and 
                                                     
20 Korsgaard (2008: 310). 
21 Velleman (2009: 116). 
22 Velleman (2009: 4). 
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epistemology of  ‘Lying is wrong’ will,” Velleman maintains, “reveal very little 
about the fundamental nature of  morality.”23 
Comments such as these support Darwall, Gibbard and Railton’s sugges-
tion that the Kantian strategy involves an attempt to transcend or bypass tra-
ditional metaethics. In light of  this ambition, it is tempting to conceive of  the 
strategy as an exercise in purely normative ethics – albeit normative ethics of  a 
notably fundamental or foundational sort. The suggestion that Korsgaard 
and Velleman are engaged only in normative maneuvers is certainly con-
sistent with much of  what they say about their respective projects. 
Korsgaard, for example, insists that the question she is trying to answer is a 
normative question—“the normative question,” in fact. Are the demands of  
morality justified? Is there anything that I really ought to do? Metaethics – 
traditionally understood to operate from a standpoint outside of  normative 
discourse – seems ill-suited to answer questions which are so clearly internal 
to that discourse. If  we are asking normative questions, then surely what is 
called for is a normative argument or theory. 
It may seem obvious that a normative theory – even a foundational one 
– could never allay broad, Mackie-style worries about our ethical practices. 
Such worries involve doubts about all of  our normative judgments, and it is 
unclear how we could ever vindicate our practice of  making normative 
judgments by making more normative judgments. We might therefore be 
tempted to conclude that the Kantian strategy pursued as an exercise in pure-
ly normative ethics can never get off  the ground. 
Such a conclusion would be premature, though. The line of  thought that 
yields it may not do justice to the sort of  normative theory Kantians aspire 
to produce. The goal of  the Kantian strategy is to ground the norms of  
practical reasoning in nonnormative foundations. In Velleman’s words, the point 
of  “trying to identify a constitutive aim of  action is to find a nonnormative 
foundation for our norms of  practical reasoning.”24 The ambition to derive 
normative conclusions from nonnormative premises is also evident in the 
work of  another famous proponent of  the Kantian strategy, Alan Gewirth. 
At the outset of  Reason and Morality, Gewirth promises to provide a “logical 
derivation of  a substantial normative moral principle from the nature of  hu-
man action.”25 His goal is thereby to show “how ‘ought’-judgments … can be 
logically and non-circularly derived from ‘is’-statements which describe . . . 
facts about the world.”26 Setting aside for the moment any doubts we might 
have about whether an “ought” can be derived from an “is,” we can see how 
this Kantian project – were it to succeed – would dispel general doubts about 
normative discourse. As Gewirth and Velleman envision this project, norma-
tive conclusions are supposed to follow merely from premises in the philos-
                                                     
23 Velleman (2009: 157). 
24 Velleman (2004: 287). 
25 Gewirth (1978: x). 
26 Gewirth (1973-74: 46). 
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ophy of  action. These premises – because they are nonnormative – fall out-
side the scope of  any general worries we might have about normative dis-
course. And any conclusions we derive from such premises will be as secure 
as the premises themselves. So, without providing or presupposing a particu-
lar semantics or metaphysics of  normative discourse – without providing a 
metaethic, in other words – the Kantian strategy could show that some of  
our normative judgments are objectively valid or correct and thus that our 
normative practices are sound. Of  course, the strategy would not tell us 
where the skeptical arguments that give rise to such worries in the first place 
go wrong, but it would assure us that they must go wrong somewhere. 
Now, however, those doubts we momentarily set aside must reclaim our 
attention: How are we supposed to derive normative conclusions from purely 
nonnormative premises without any metanormative assistance? How, in oth-
er words, are we supposed to derive an “ought” from an “is”? Hume famous-
ly argued that such derivations are “altogether inconceivable.” 27 Yet even 
some philosophers who think that Hume was on to something take the 
Kantian strategy to be a special case. These philosophers accept the rule that 
we cannot derive an “ought” from an “is” but maintain there are exceptions 
– special conditions that license this otherwise specious sort of  inference, 
conditions such as unthinkability (Korsgaard), inconsistency (Gewirth) or a cer-
tain kind of  teleology (Velleman).28 We need not consider these arguments in 
detail here, though, since various critics of  the Kantian strategy have already 
shown that even appeals to such special conditions fail to support the rele-
vant normative conclusions.29 Either these appeals leave the inference from 
nonnormative premises to normative conclusion ungrounded (in which case 
the lacuna remains), or they achieve the desired derivation but only by relying 
on some substantive normative assumption (in which case they deviate from 
the Kantian agenda). Both outcomes leave the Kantian strategy unable to 
dislodge Mackie-style worries about our normative practices. 
This failure confirms what we already suspected: we cannot derive nor-
mative conclusions from nonnormative premises about agency without rely-
ing on metanormative assumptions concerning the semantics or metaphysics 
of  normative discourse. In retrospect, the failure of  this purely normative 
understanding of  the Kantian strategy should not be surprising. Despite her 
apparent lack of  interest in traditional metanormative questions, Korsgaard 
has repeatedly and explicitly presented her account of  the foundations of  
                                                     
27 Hume (2000/1739: 302). 
28 For Korsgaard’s appeals to unthinkability, see (1996: 258) and (2008: 61-62). For Gewirth’s 
appeals to inconsistency, see (1978: 150-60). For Velleman’s appeal to teleology, see (2009: 125, 
136), as well as (2000: 176-82, 246). 
29 For two related and particularly insightful discussions of  Korsgaard’s move from inescap-
ability to normativity, see Fitzpatrick (2005) and Enoch (2006). For criticisms of  Gewirth’s 
attempt to derive an “ought” from an “is,” see Stohs (1988), Allen (1982) and Adams (1980). 
Finally, for criticism of  Velleman’s appeal to aims, see Silverstein, “Normativity from Agen-
cy.” 
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ethics as an alternative to realism – not to the relatively thin or “procedural” 
thesis that there are correct answers to normative questions, but rather to the 
“substantive” and straightforwardly metanormative view that the existence 
of  normative facts together with our knowledge of  them is what explains 
our ethical practices.30 Moreover, the Kantian strategy – at least as it is out-
lined by Williams and implemented by Korsgaard and Velleman – is sup-
posed to do more than provide a compelling normative argument for a de-
sired ethical conclusion. It is supposed to unearth the sources of  normativity, 
to explain how there could be such a thing as normativity – how there could 
be considerations that are genuinely authoritative or normative judgments 
that are objectively valid. It should be clear that no purely normative theory 
could ever accomplish this. 
Kantians need not despair, though. The lesson we should draw from 
these failures is not that the Kantian strategy is doomed, but rather that it is a 
mistake to interpret that strategy as merely an exercise in normative ethics. 
The Kantian appeal to inescapability cannot stand on its own. When we 
combine that appeal with a traditional metanormative theory, however, the 
result is something much more potent. 
 
2. Kantian Expressivism 
 
Perhaps the most natural metanormative complement to the Kantian strategy 
is expressivism. Expressivism, as I understand it, consists of  two central 
claims: first, that we should understand the meaning of  normative statements 
in terms of  the states of  mind they express, and second, that those states of  
mind are primarily or essentially conative rather than cognitive.31 According 
to expressivism, then, normative thought is fundamentally practical in nature. 
For if  the attitudes expressed by normative statements are essentially cona-
tive, then we cannot grasp the nature of  normative thought by approaching it 
as though it were a kind of  theoretical reasoning about the state of  the 
world. If  expressivism is correct, we should – at least initially – conceive of  
normative questions not as questions about what is the case, but rather as 
questions about what to do, think or feel.32 
One reason expressivism seems like a natural partner for the Kantian 
strategy is that proponents of  that strategy – and Velleman and Korsgaard, in 
                                                     
30 See Korsgaard (1996: 35-48) for her account of  the distinction between “procedural” and 
“substantive” normative realism and her unequivocal rejection of  the latter. Compare Vel-
leman (2009: 115-17, 139). See Hussain and Shah (forthcoming: 2-3) for a similar observa-
tion about Korsgaard’s opposition to realism. 
31 Note that I have defined expressivism so that it is consistent with but separable from the 
quasi-realism with which it is now so frequently associated. If  the states of  mind expressed 
by normative statements are only primarily or essentially conative, then that leaves open the 
possibility that they are also cognitive (as the quasi-realist maintains) and thus candidates for 
truth and potential objects of  knowledge. 
32 Compare Blackburn (1998: 69-70) and Gibbard (1990: 75) and (2003: 10). 
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particular – often make claims that would be quite at home in any expressiv-
ist treatise. Velleman at least flirts with expressivism, for instance, when he 
observes that his Kantian approach “forgoes the step of  transposing de-
mands into indicative judgments” and instead “leaves them in their practical 
form, as demands – or at least as practical thoughts of  some kind, such as 
aims or commitments or projects.”33 Korsgaard’s work displays a more prom-
inent expressivist streak. In The Sources of  Normativity, she repeatedly denies 
that normative questions are “third-person, theoretical” questions about the 
world and argues instead that they are “first-person,” practical questions 
which arise only for an agent deliberating about what to do.34 Accordingly, 
ethical reasoning is just “reflection about what to do, not reflection about 
what is to be found in the normative part of  the world.” 35  Elsewhere 
Korsgaard reiterates this thought: “Practical philosophy … is not a matter of  
finding knowledge to apply in practice. It is rather the use of  reason to solve 
practical problems.”36 It would be difficult to find a more textbook statement 
of  the motivation behind expressivism (hence one of  its earlier appellations: 
noncognitivism). 
A second (and more important) reason to partner the Kantian appeal to 
inescapability with expressivism is that the product is a view with considera-
ble promise. To see this, first recall that one point of  the Kantian strategy, at 
least as it is described by Williams and appropriated by Korsgaard and Vel-
leman, is to vanquish the broad skeptical worry that normative discourse is 
somehow based on an illusion and that consequently nothing really matters. 
As we have already seen, to the extent that this worry is grounded, as it is for 
Mackie, in external, metanormative claims about the semantics and meta-
physics of  ethics, we cannot allay it simply by appealing to further normative 
judgments. All such judgments fall within the disputed discourse and are thus 
no more credible than the judgments they are meant to vindicate. This is why 
the Kantian strategy conceived as an attempt to overcome external doubts 
about normative discourse through purely normative ethics seems hopeless. 
But now let us add an expressivist theory of  normative discourse to the 
mix. According to expressivism, it is a mistake to understand normative 
judgments, at least initially, as attempts to represent the state of  the world. 
Rather, we should understand them as essentially practical commitments. 
Even without filling in the details of  any particular expressivist theory, we 
can see that the addition of  expressivism places the Kantian strategy in a 
much better position to dismiss broad external worries about normative dis-
course. For if  ethical statements express essentially practical (or otherwise 
noncognitive) attitudes, they do not presuppose the dubious metaphysical 
commitments that invite Mackie’s skepticism. If  some form of  expressivism 
                                                     
33 Velleman (2009: 116). 
34 Korsgaard (1996: 16). 
35 Korsgaard (1996: 116). 
36 Korsgaard (2008: 321). 
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is correct, then we need not posit the existence of  normative facts and prop-
erties in order to vindicate normative discourse, and consequently, metaphys-
ical doubts about the existence of  such facts and properties are beside the 
point.37 Normative discourse cannot rest on the sort of  collective delusion 
envisioned by Mackie if  our normative judgments are not essentially attempts 
to represent the state of  the world. 
Notice, though, that the Kantian strategy itself  – the appeal to inescapa-
ble commitments or aims – plays no role in this victory over Mackie’s skepti-
cism. Expressivism is doing all of  the work. This should not be surprising. 
Mackie’s worries are essentially metanormative. They arise out of  semantic 
claims about the truth conditions of  normative judgments and metaphysical 
concerns about queer normative properties, and these are the purview of  
theorists examining our normative practices from the outside. We should 
therefore expect any solution to Mackie’s challenge to depend on metanor-
mative theorizing. 
But if  expressivism alone is responsible for the defeat of  Mackie-style 
skepticism, is there any work left for the Kantian strategy to do? Is this really, 
in other words, a vindication of  the Kantian strategy? I believe that it can be. 
If  expressivism is correct, then the only doubts about the authority or objec-
tivity of  ethics it makes sense to entertain are doubts internal to ethical dis-
course.38 And the Kantian strategy is well situated to address such doubts, or at 
least to assure us that they will be addressed satisfactorily. 
Let me elaborate. In the face of  strong challenges to our fundamental 
ethical commitments, we might sometimes begin to worry about the status 
of  those commitments. In particular, we might wonder why we cannot say 
more on their behalf. Of  course we can always justify one commitment by 
appealing to another, but in that direction there looms a potentially vicious 
regress of  justification. This realization can quickly lead to the suspicion that 
our commitments are not what they should be. This suspicion might be 
merely local – confined to the justification of  certain moral principles, per-
haps – or it might be more global. In the extreme, we might throw up our 
hands and conclude that nothing matters at all. Of  course, if  we are of  a 
suitably philosophical bent, questions about the status of  our ethical com-
mitments will feel pressing even if  our confidence in them has not been 
                                                     
37 A quasi-realist version of  expressivism might be committed to the existence of  normative 
facts and properties. Quasi-realists, however, deny that their metaphysical commitments, 
such as they are, are of  the sort threatened by Mackie-style arguments. Instead they insist 
that normative facts and properties are merely the minimalist shadows of  true normative 
propositions. For an argument that quasi-realists cannot have their metaphysical and episte-
mological cake and eat it too, see Street (2011). 
38 Doubt is a cognitive notion, and it is natural to wonder whether there is room for norma-
tive doubt in a theory according to which normative statements express essentially conative 
states of  mind. Here I simply assume that some form of  quasi-realism can provide expres-
sivists with the resources they need in order to make sense of  the idea of  normative doubt. I 
am indebted to Nishi Shah for helpful discussion of  this point. 
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shaken at all. I need not doubt that murder is wrong in order to wonder – in 
a philosophical frame of  mind – what makes it wrong. 
Whether these questions about our ethical commitments stem from 
nagging doubts about the status of  those commitments or merely from idle 
philosophical curiosity about the particulars of  their justification, the im-
portant point is that the questions – and the worries that might inspire them 
– are internal to our practice of  making normative judgments. They are, in 
other words, normative questions. They consist of  questions or doubts about 
whether our commitments are the right ones to have, not doubts about 
whether the practice of  having commitments is confused or unsound. Put 
metaphorically, they express doubts about whether the moves we are making 
in the normative game are the correct moves to make, not worries that there 
is something fundamentally amiss with the game itself. And because these 
questions are internal to normative discourse, the Kantian strategy can help 
us answer them. 
If, for example, you are wondering whether you ought to put any stock 
in the norms of  morality, then showing you that certain moral conclusions 
follow from commitments you already have is an excellent way of  demon-
strating that you should. This is how normative ethics is usually practiced: we 
try to convince one another that our normative theories are correct by argu-
ing that they follow from more basic normative principles we all share. The 
Kantian strategy offers us a way to make such arguments with a level of  con-
fidence we might not otherwise have, since the strategy assures us that there 
are at least some commitments all of  our potential interlocutors must share. 
If  we can identify what those inescapable commitments are – and if  we can 
show that certain conclusions follow from them – then we can engage in eth-
ical debates certain that our opponents will not be able to escape the force of  
our arguments by claiming to cleave to different fundamental values.  
But what if  your doubts extend even to those foundational, inescapable 
commitments? Suppose you wonder, for instance, whether you should value 
even your own humanity. If  Korsgaard is correct, any deliberation on this 
question will necessarily lead you to conclude that you should. This is just the 
sense in which the commitment is inescapable. But is this enough to restore 
your confidence in that commitment? Does it follow from this inescapability 
that your humanity is actually valuable? Above, when we were examining 
purely normative versions of  the Kantian strategy, we suggested that it does 
not follow. In that case our reason for rejecting the inference was that there is 
no obvious connection between the structure or logic of  practical reasoning 
on the one hand and the truth of  our normative judgments on the other. 
However, this is the right way to think about the Kantian strategy reason only 
if  we assume that our normative statements express beliefs. If  expressivism is correct, 
then you cannot step outside the practical point of  view and still ask mean-
ingful questions about whether your humanity really is valuable. (That would 
be, as Korsgaard suggests, akin to trying to see the colors I see by cracking 
open my skull.) Questions about the value of  your humanity have signifi-
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cance only inside normative discourse, and once you step back inside that 
discourse, your only way to answer these questions is to engage in precisely 
the sort of  reasoning that will necessarily, according to Korsgaard, yield the 
conclusion that your humanity is valuable. Even the most serious doubts 
must give way. 
Let me put the point another way. If  expressivism is correct, there is 
something wrong with the question that purely normative versions of  the 
Kantian strategy cannot answer. There is something misguided about asking 
whether the fact that we inescapably value humanity entails that humanity is 
valuable. This question presupposes that the Kantian strategy aims to deliver 
a deductive argument with inescapability as a premise and some normative 
judgment as a conclusion. But that is not the right way to conceive of  the 
Kantian strategy, at least when it is paired with expressivism. The question 
whether humanity is valuable is a normative one, and if  expressivism is cor-
rect this question is answerable only from the practical or first-person point 
of  view. Yet from that point of  view what we see is the value of  the end itself, 
not ourselves valuing it. The inescapability of  our commitment plays no part 
in the expressivist version of  the Kantian argument: the premise to which we 
appeal is not that we are inescapably committed to valuing our own humanity, but 
simply that our own humanity is valuable. And from this premise it obviously 
does follow that we ought to value our own humanity. Thus, when we com-
bine the Kantian strategy with expressivism, what justifies the Kantian’s 
normative conclusion is the value to which we are inescapably committed, 
not the fact that we are inescapably committed to it. The fact of  inescapabil-
ity is something we observe from outside the practical point of  view. It mere-
ly reassures those of  us standing on the sidelines of  the normative game 
what we will find justified once we start playing again. You might still be 
tempted to object that this does not prove that humanity is in fact valuable. 
But if  expressivism is correct, then the only thing you can be wondering 
when you raise this objection is whether to value humanity. And that is a 
practical question.39 Korsgaard encourages you to ask it, because she knows 
how you must answer it. 
Recall that the point of  the Kantian strategy is to secure the objective valid-
ity of  at least some of  our ethical judgments. Mackie casts doubt on their ob-
jectivity by arguing that ethics is the sort of  business which requires meta-
physical backing in order to be solvent. Since, according to Mackie, the only 
possible metaphysical backers are normative properties too queer to be cred-
ible, we should invest ourselves in some practical alternative to ethics. If  ex-
pressivism is correct, though, then the enterprise of  ethics requires no meta-
physical underwriting, and doubts about its solvency are therefore misplaced. 
Yet this victory over Mackie’s skepticism may not relieve all of  our doubts 
about the objectivity of  our values. We might still wonder, for instance, what 
makes our commitments any more valid than those of  the many people with 
                                                     
39 Compare Gibbard (1999: 154). 
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whom we disagree about ethical matters. The crucial point is that – if  expres-
sivism is correct – in wondering this we can only be engaged in straightfor-
ward normative reasoning, reasoning internal to the practice of  ethics. And 
this is where the Kantian strategy comes into play. For if  the Kantian argu-
ment that certain commitments are inescapable is sound, then straightfor-
ward normative reasoning always leads us back to those commitments. The 
only type of  reasoning available to us necessarily yields the conclusion that 
these commitments are the correct ones. And that is the sense in which they 
are objectively valid. Of  course our ethical commitments will not have the 
kind of  objectivity that would come with the metaphysical backing of  onto-
logically prior normative properties and facts, but that sort of  objectivity was 
never more than a chimera, at least if  expressivism is true. Instead they will 
have the only kind of  objective validity commitments can have: the kind we 
cannot help but see whenever we engage in practical deliberation.40 
If  the foregoing is correct, then the Kantian argument about inescapa-
bility and the expressivist account of  normative discourse are both doing 
crucial work in this expressivist version of  the Kantian strategy. From ex-
                                                     
40 Kantian expressivists might be tempted to argue for objective validity somewhat different-
ly. As we noted above, even after Mackie’s external skepticism about ethics has been defeat-
ed, we may continue to worry that our values are merely subjective. We may, for instance, 
fear that those values are largely the product of  our own peculiar upbringing and biases. And 
in the face of  such fears, we might try to employ the Kantian strategy as follows: 
 
My values cannot be merely the product of  my upbringing, since those val-
ues are inescapable. In other words, my values cannot be subjective if  they 
are necessarily shared by all agents. And if  they are not subjective, they 
must be objective. Therefore, my values are objectively valid. 
 
The problem with this line of  argument is that it confuses objective validity with universality. 
The fact that some commitment is inescapable entails that every agent shares that commit-
ment, and thus that the commitment is universal. It does not entail, though, that the com-
mitment in question has any kind of  authority or validity. This is the same lacuna we encoun-
tered above when we examined the purely normative forms of  the Kantian strategy: It re-
mains unclear why I should take comfort in the fact that my values are shared by everyone 
else, or even in the fact that they are necessarily so shared. That my values are inescapable 
seems to be no guarantee that they are the correct values to have. 
This line of  argument runs into trouble because it abandons the first-person, practical 
point of  view that is so central to the expressivist version of  the Kantian strategy. This leads 
me to suspect that Kantian expressivism may not actually be a viable route for Velleman, 
despite my suggestion that we can read him as an expressivist. Velleman contends that our 
inescapable commitment takes the form of  a desire or drive, yet he resists the thought that 
being motivated toward something in this way necessarily involves valuing it (Velleman 
(2000) and (2008: 410-11)). But if  we can desire or aim at something without valuing it, then 
the fact that action constitutively aims at self-understanding tells us nothing about how our 
normative reasoning must play out – even reasoning about whether self-understanding is 
worth pursuing. It tells us nothing about which values or commitments we will embrace 
within the practical point of  view. Of  course, if  Velleman is right about the nature of  agen-
cy, the aim of  self-understanding will always govern such reasoning, but there is no guaran-
tee that this aim will guide us to some particular normative conclusion. 
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pressivism it follows that there is only one way we can meaningfully entertain 
doubts about the value of  humanity – namely, from within the practical point 
of  view. And according to Korsgaard’s Kantian argument, this way of  enter-
taining doubts always and necessarily results in our repudiating them. When-
ever we take up the question of  whether to value humanity, we inevitably ar-
rive at the same answer: we should. If  at this point you wonder why it fol-
lows from this Kantian story about inescapability that humanity is in fact val-
uable, you are just engaging once again in the very process the story de-
scribes. And if  the Kantian story is correct, you will arrive at the same an-
swer. Essentially, the conclusion that humanity is valuable is the only one 
available to you, for there is no way to step outside of  the practical stand-
point and ask whether it is really the right answer. 
This is indeed a vindication of  the Kantian strategy, then, although it 
will not seem so to philosophers whose commitment to that strategy is root-
ed in a desire to bypass the quagmire of  traditional metaethics. A full articu-
lation and defense of  Kantian expressivism would drive us headlong into that 
quagmire, where we would soon confront the Frege-Geach problem, the 
problem of  creeping minimalism, and other familiar and pressing objections 
to expressivism. Philosophers who find expressivism unpalatable need not 
abandon the Kantian strategy, though: there is more than one path through 
the morass of  contemporary metaethics for Kantians to follow. 
 
3. Kantian Reductionism 
 
Perhaps the most obvious way to bridge the divide between nonnormative 
premises about the commitments constitutive of  agency and the normative 
conclusions at which the Kantian strategy aims is via a reductionist account 
of  the truth conditions of  normative judgments – in particular, an account 
that locates those truth conditions in the structure of  practical thought or 
elsewhere in the conditions of  agency. Velleman harbored reductionist ambi-
tions in much of  his early work, though he has since renounced those ambi-
tions.41 Gewirth at least flirts with reductionism when he states that norma-
tive truth is a function of  what agents logically must accept. 42  Even 
Korsgaard occasionally gestures in this direction. At one point in The Sources 
of  Normativity she proposes that “the normative word ‘reason’ refers to a kind 
of  reflective success.”43 This cryptic remark could be read as an attempt to 
provide a semantics for talk about reasons. In particular, it suggests a reduc-
tionist theory according to which a consideration is a reason for action just in 
case it figures in or brings about successful reflection on the question of  
what to do. 
                                                     
41 For his reductionism, see Velleman (1989: 197-208); for the renunciation, see Velleman 
(2004: 294-97). 
42 See Gewirth (1973-4: 60). 
43 Korsgaard (1996: 93). 
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There are popular views in the metaethics literature that comport with 
these fairly inchoate descriptions. Consider Sharon Street’s constructivism. 
According to Street, “normative truth consists in what is entailed from with-
in the practical point of  view.”44 More specifically, “the fact that X is a reason 
to Y for agent A is constituted by the fact that the judgment that X is a rea-
son to Y (for A) withstands scrutiny from the standpoint of  A’s other judg-
ments about reasons.”45 Even without introducing the details of  Street’s con-
structivist theory, it should be clear how it can bridge the gap between 
nonnormative premises about our inescapable commitments and normative 
conclusions about what we have reason to do. If, for instance, we cannot 
help but value of  our own humanity, then the conclusion that our humanity 
is valuable is entailed from within the practical point of  view. That is, the 
judgment that our humanity is valuable will necessarily withstand scrutiny 
from the standpoint of  our other normative judgments about reasons, since 
the judgment that our humanity is valuable will necessarily be among those 
judgments. That is what it means for the commitment to be inescapable. So, 
when we supplement the Kantian strategy with a metaethic like Street’s, we 
have a clear explanation of  how the Kantian strategy can yield the promised 
normative conclusions.46 
Once again, though, we might wonder whether this is really a vindication 
of  the Kantian strategy. It may seem, just as it did when we introduced Kant-
ian expressivism in the previous section, that the metanormative half  of  this 
new Kantian hybrid is doing all of  the heavy lifting, especially when it comes 
to neutralizing broad, Mackie-style doubts about normative discourse. For if  
constructivism is the correct metanormative theory, then normative dis-
course does not presuppose the sort of  stance-independent normative prop-
erties Mackie finds so queer. It presupposes only that some normative judg-
ments withstand scrutiny from the standpoint of  other normative judgments. 
And that looks both metaphysically and epistemologically unproblematic – 
nothing queer in sight. Constructivism alone is therefore sufficient to rule 
out the irrealist hypothesis that our invocations of  normative authority inevi-
tably misfire. 
Is there any work left for the Kantian appeal to inescapability to do? As 
before, I believe there is. Street’s constructivism initially seems to entail subjec-
tivism about reasons for action. Since what A judges or takes to be a reason is 
presumably a contingent feature of  A’s psychology, the normative judgments 
which withstand scrutiny from the standpoint of  A’s other judgments are 
                                                     
44 Street (2010: 367). 
45 Street (2008: 223). 
46 There are views in addition to Street’s that should be able to do the same work. See, for 
instance, Coleman (unpublished manuscript); Schroeder (2007); and perhaps even Williams 
(1981). Which metanormative view is most appropriate may depend on what form the ines-
capable commitment takes, that is, whether it is a desire, an intention, a purpose or – as we 
have been supposing – a judgment. For a metanormative view that pairs well with a Kantian 
appeal to constitutive aims, see Silverstein, “Ethics and Practical Reasoning.” 
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likely to be different from those which withstand scrutiny from the stand-
point of  B’s other judgments. That is, the normative judgments entailed from 
within A’s practical point of  view are likely to be different from those en-
tailed from within B’s practical point of  view. It would therefore be surprising 
if  all of  the considerations that count as reasons for A also count as reasons 
for B. Moreover, even claims that are universally valid – even considerations 
that are normative for all actual agents – will be only contingently so; we will 
always be able to imagine agents with different normative commitments, 
agents who would thereby escape the force of  what had appeared to be ob-
jectively valid normative claims. The picture we are left with is one in which 
there are no objectively authoritative or valid normative claims: normative 
claims that are necessarily valid with respect to any agent. Now, however, let 
us reintroduce into the mix Kantian premises about inescapable commit-
ments. In particular, let us suppose that there are certain considerations any 
agent must accept as reasons for action. The normativity of  those considera-
tions will possess an objectivity that was missing from the constructivist pic-
ture, which included only contingent commitments. These considerations will 
be necessarily authoritative for any possible agent. And so even though we 
began with a metanormative view that appeared to allow only for subjective 
reasons for action, combining that view with the Kantian strategy makes 
room for ethical objectivity. 
Once again, we have vindicated the Kantian strategy – except in the eyes 
of  those who hope to secure the objectivity of  ethics without recourse to 
traditional metaethics. But just as Kantian expressivism is vulnerable to vari-
ous familiar criticisms of  expressivism, so too is this second Kantian hybrid 
open to well-known metanormative objections. To see this, notice that 
Street’s constructivism involves a kind of  reductionism about normativity. 
Normative facts turn out to be facts about what is entailed from within the 
practical point of  view, and the sense of  entailment at work here does not 
presuppose any normative notions. As Street puts it, “to explain this sense of  
entailment, we need not make any substantive normative assumptions – for 
example, about what anyone should or ought to do or infer, or about what 
counts as a normative reason for what.”47 
The fact that Street’s view is a form of  reductionism means that any take 
on the Kantian strategy which incorporates her constructivism must con-
front some variant of  G. E. Moore’s famous open question argument. 
Roughly, the Moorean challenge is this: Why should we think that normative 
facts are as the constructivist describes them? Why should we think that the 
property of  withstanding scrutiny from the standpoint of  our other norma-
tive judgments is the property we mean to invoke when we make normative 
claims about what we ought to do? As Street acknowledges, facts about what 
is entailed from within the practical point of  view are a combination of  psy-
chological and logical facts. Why should we think that in settling these mat-
                                                     
47 Street (2010: 367). 
JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY | VOL. 6, NO. 3 
INESCAPABILITY AND NORMATIVITY 
Matthew Silverstein 
 
 18 
ters we are also settling the question of  what we ought to do? Put another 
way, why should we think that what we have reason to do is a function of  
what we take ourselves to have reason to do? Settling the facts about what 
follows from what we take our reasons to be does not seem to close (or even nec-
essarily bear on) the question of  what our reasons actually are. I can acknowledge 
that my current normative commitments entail a particular normative con-
clusion but still wonder whether that conclusion is true. Even after the full 
set of  my normative commitments is laid bare, the question of  what I ought 
to do appears to remain open, and this suggests that normative questions are 
about something other than what follows from within the practical point of  
view. 
Any reductionist version of  the Kantian strategy must answer such 
questions, and that will inevitably require wading into murky metanormative 
waters. Of  course, just as the Kantian expressivist can hope to solve the 
problems that plague expressivism, so can the Kantian reductionist offer re-
sponses to the objections facing reductionism. And nothing I have argued 
here suggests that those responses will be unsuccessful. I actually have high 
hopes for some form of  Kantian reductionism. My point here is simply that 
although Kantians can dodge the many objections to expressivism by em-
bracing reductionism, they cannot thereby circumvent metanormative obsta-
cles altogether. 
 
4. A Third Way? 
 
In section 1 I suggested – following Darwall, Gibbard and Railton – that the 
most natural way to interpret various remarks made by proponents of  the 
Kantian strategy is as expressing the ambition to bypass traditional 
metaethics. I then argued that the Kantian strategy so understood cannot 
succeed: if  the Kantian strategy is to be salvaged, the effort to leave 
metaethics behind must be abandoned. Perhaps, however, I have misunder-
stood the Kantians’ aspiration with respect to metaethics. Perhaps we should 
interpret their goal to avoid ordinary metaethics not as the desire to eschew 
metaethics altogether, but rather as the desire to do extraordinary metaethics. 
If  that is their ambition, then Kantians will be unsatisfied with the conclu-
sions of  sections 2 and 3, for there is nothing extraordinary about expressiv-
ism and reductionism in metaethics. We must therefore consider the possibil-
ity that the Kantian appeal to inescapability is meant to be paired with a 
metanormative view distinct from both expressivism and reductionism as 
well as from realism – a sui generis Kantian metaethic. 
It is tempting to read Korsgaard as offering such a metaethic, especially 
when she promises to offer a “theory of  normative concepts” that is a “gen-
uine alternative” to the one that “stands behind the debate between cognitiv-
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ists and noncognitivists.”48 I believe we should resist this temptation. Alt-
hough Korsgaard intends to offer an extraordinary metaethic – a third way – 
she fails to distinguish her theory from the ordinary metanormative views 
canvassed above. At times she leans heavily in the direction of  expressivism, 
and at other times her remarks suggest some form of  reductionism. At no 
time, however, does she point toward a view distinct from these two. 
As I noted at the outset of  section 2, many of  Korsgaard’s attempts to 
articulate her account of  the sources of  normativity suggest a distinctly ex-
pressivist understanding of  normative discourse. According to Korsgaard, 
normative questions are simply questions about “what to think, what to like, 
what to say, what to do, and what to be.”49 Her criticisms of  realism corrobo-
rate this expressivist reading. She insists that the problem with realism is that 
it presupposes that our worries about ethics are worries about the loss of  
ethical knowledge. Realists never pause to ask “whether knowledge of  ethical 
objects, or indeed any sort of  knowledge at all, is really what we want here in the 
first place.”50 
Korsgaard sounds most like an expressivist when she is attempting to 
describe the mistake of  asking normative questions from outside the first-
person point of  view. 
 
Value, like freedom, is only directly accessible from within the standpoint 
of  reflective consciousness. And I am now talking about it externally, for I 
am describing the nature of  the consciousness that gives rise to the per-
ception of  value. From this external, third-person perspective, all we can 
say is that when we are in the first-person perspective, we find ourselves 
to be valuable, rather than simply that we are valuable. There is nothing 
surprising in this. Trying to see the value of  humanity from the third-
person [external] perspective is like trying to see the colors someone sees 
by cracking open his skull. From the outside, all we can say is why he sees 
them.51 
 
Compare this to Simon Blackburn’s expressivist account of  where we can 
find ethical truth. 
 
The answer is that it is not anywhere that can be visible from this side-
ways, theoretical perspective. It is not that this perspective is illegitimate, 
but that it is not the one adapted for finding ethical truth. It would be if  
such truth were natural truth, or consisted of  the existence of  states of  
                                                     
48 Korsgaard (2008: 310). Commentators who appear to read Korsgaard as offering a sui 
generis metaethic include Schneewind, who labels her view “non-reductive naturalized Kanti-
an foundationalism” (1997: 791) and FitzPatrick (2005: 657-60). 
49 Korsgaard (1996: 9). 
50 Korsgaard (1996: 47). I am hardly the first reader of  Korsgaard’s work to interpret her as 
an expressivist. In his review of  The Sources of  Normativity, Gibbard lays out Korsgaard’s ac-
count of  normative concepts and then adds: “This is the doctrine I call expressivism” (1999: 
141). See also Schroeder (2010: 164) and Hussain and Shah (forthcoming). 
51 Korsgaard (1996: 124). 
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affairs in the real world. That is the world seen from the viewpoint that 
sees different and conflicting moral systems – but inevitably sees no truth 
in just one of  them. To “see” the truth that wanton cruelty is wrong de-
mands moralizing, stepping back into the boat or putting back the lens of  
a sensibility.52 
 
For Korsgaard, just as for Blackburn, normativity is not something we can 
find (or even talk about) from the third-person, theoretical point of  view. 
Normative talk – talk of  values and reasons – comes alive only from the per-
spective of  someone engaged in first-person reasoning about what to do, 
what to think or what to feel. Only here – “within the standpoint of  reflec-
tive consciousness” or, as Blackburn puts it, behind the “lens of  a sensibility” 
– are normative judgments appropriate or meaningful. 
Korsgaard, of  course, repeatedly denies that she is an expressivist. The 
closest she ever comes to praising expressivism is when she declares that it, 
like realism, is true, but “only in a way that makes it boring.”53 Given her as-
sessment of  realism, this is hardly a heartfelt endorsement. Her reasons for 
thinking that her view differs from expressivism are not at all compelling, 
though. 
 
The distinction [between cognitivism and noncognitivism] suggests that a 
moral judgment either articulates a description of  some fact or is a dis-
guised version of  some alternative use of  language – either expressive or 
prescriptive. But where does this leave theories like Aristotle’s or Kant’s, 
according to which moral judgments are the conclusions of  practical rea-
soning? A conclusion of  practical reasoning is not obviously a description 
of  a fact about the world, but it hardly seems like some sort of  emotional 
expletive either. Where do these theories fit?54 
 
It is not clear why Korsgaard supposes that rejecting cognitivism and thereby 
denying that ethical judgments are statements of  fact requires one to con-
clude that they are merely emotional expletives. This may have been the view 
of  one famous early noncognitivist – A. J. Ayer – but it would be a mistake 
to describe the varieties of  expressivism fashionable today in such terms. In 
fact, the genealogy of  modern-day expressivism – beginning with Charles 
Stevenson and proceeding through R. M. Hare to Simon Blackburn and Al-
lan Gibbard – is very much the story of  philosophers working to develop an 
account of  ethical judgments according to which those judgments – even 
though they are not straightforward statements of  fact – can nonetheless be 
employed in deliberation that deserves to be called reasoning. Despite 
Korsgaard’s claim to the contrary, then, it appears that the distinction be-
tween cognitivism and noncognitivism leaves plenty of  room for theories like 
Aristotle’s and Kant’s (as she understands them). 
                                                     
52 Blackburn (1993: 372). 
53 Korsgaard (2008: 325, n. 49). 
54 Korsgaard (2008: 309). 
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Another reason Korsgaard might deny that her view is tantamount to 
expressivism is that she wants to leave room for talk of  truth and facts in the 
normative realm. She believes that “there are right and wrong ways to an-
swer” normative questions, and that this is sufficient for there to be “norma-
tive truth.”55 But expressivism also leaves room for such talk, at least when it 
is paired – as it standardly is – with quasi-realism. There is not space here to 
lay out the details of  any of  the various quasi-realist strategies for securing 
talk of  normative truth and objectivity within an expressivist metaethic. The 
basic idea is familiar enough, though: expressivists can countenance talk of  
normative truth and objectivity by interpreting appeals to those notions 
simply as expressions of  complex or higher-order but still essentially conative 
attitudes. One might wonder at this point whether, if  quasi-realism is suffi-
cient to license talk of  objectivity in the normative realm, there is any work 
left for the Kantian appeal to inescapability to do. There is. As I argued in 
section 2, what the Kantian strategy adds to expressivism is not the right to 
speak of  normative truth or objectivity in general, but rather the resources to 
argue for particular normative truths, such as those concerning the value of  
humanity. 
What ultimately makes the expressivist reading of  Korsgaard so attrac-
tive is her repeated insistence that – despite the legitimacy of  talk about 
normative truths and facts – the primary function of  normative concepts is 
not to represent the world. Even if  we can incorporate normative concepts 
into what look like straightforward assertions that describe reality, the fun-
damental role of  these concepts is to help us engage in genuinely practical 
reasoning or, as Korsgaard often puts it, to help us solve practical problems. 
Many readers of  Korsgaard are nevertheless reluctant to interpret her as 
an expressivist. Even if  such reluctance is warranted, however, we should not 
conclude that she is offering a sui generis Kantian metaethic. We have already 
found fault with Korsgaard’s reasons for denying the exhaustiveness of  the 
distinction between cognitivism and noncognitivism. And so, if  she is not an 
expressivist, she must be a cognitivist of  some variety. What is more, there 
are good reasons to think that she must be a reductionist as well. How else 
can we understand her assertion that normative concepts “are the names of ” 
solutions to practical problems and that “the normative word ‘reason’ refers 
to a kind of  reflective success”?56 For that matter, how else can we make 
sense of  her confidence that facts about the inescapability of  certain norma-
tive judgments entail the truth or correctness of  those normative judgments? 
As I argued in section 1, if  Korsgaard is a cognitivist, then absent some re-
ductive hypothesis linking normative statements to statements about the log-
ic of  practical thought – or linking normative facts to facts about the logic of  
practical thought – there is no way to move from the claim that we inescapa-
                                                     
55 Korsgaard (1996: 35). 
56 Korsgaard (2008: 322) and (1996: 93). Commentators who read Korsgaard roughly along 
such cognitivist lines include Smith (1999: 386) and Street (2010: 366). 
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bly judge humanity to be valuable to the conclusion that humanity is in fact 
valuable, at least without the help of  some auxiliary normative premise. And 
for reasons I have already explained, the Kantian strategy cannot accomplish 
what its proponents hope to accomplish if  it incorporates such a premise. 
Reductionism, then, seems to be the only avenue remaining. 
Korsgaard’s insistence that normative concepts do not describe “exter-
nal reality” might lead some to conclude that she cannot be a cognitivist.57 
But the suggestion that our normative concepts do not describe external reali-
ty is perfectly consistent with cognitivism, since those concepts might instead 
describe internal reality – that is, the reality of  what does and does not survive 
practical reflection, or of  what does and does not solve practical problems. 
Thoughts employing such concepts would be straightforwardly cognitive, but 
they would also be able to play the role in practical reasoning Korsgaard re-
serves for normative judgments. They would, for example, help us think and 
talk about the solutions to our practical problems. 
Another worry one might have about this reductionist reading of  
Korsgaard’s view is that it misses what is distinctive about her metanormative 
outlook, namely, her claim that normativity is essentially first-personal – that 
normative force is something which can be felt only from the standpoint of  a 
deliberating agent. Korsgaard might be a cognitivist, the worry goes, but the 
essence of  her view is her distinctly practical account of  normativity. This is 
what constitutes her sui generis Kantian metaethic; any reductionist account of  
normative concepts or properties is at most an afterthought – an offering to 
metaethicists interested in “boring” questions about the semantics of  norma-
tive judgments. 
The reductionism cannot be an afterthought, though. Korsgaard’s dis-
tinctive metanormative contribution may very well be her account of  the es-
sentially practical nature of  normative force. But if  Korsgaard is a cognitivist, 
that account can do the work she wants it to do only if  it is paired with a re-
ductionist semantics that links normative judgments to the force we experi-
ence as deliberating agents. After all, it is our everyday normative questions – 
questions about what we ought to do – that Korsgaard seeks to address. And 
without a reductionist semantics, we have no assurance that the peculiarly 
practical force Korsgaard has identified is the kind of  force we invoke when 
we ask such questions. Put another way, without the reductionist semantics, 
we have no way of  ruling out the possibility that in focusing on the force we 
feel from the practical point of  view, Korsgaard has just changed the subject. 
On any cognitivist understanding of  Korsgaard’s view, then, a reductionist 
semantics is indispensable. 
There is, then, no sui generis Kantian metaethic on offer in Korsgaard’s 
work. Nor have we been given any reason to think that one is even available. 
Does this spell doom for the Kantian strategy? Hardly. If  I am correct, any 
viable version of  the Kantian strategy is going to face familiar metanorma-
                                                     
57 Korsgaard (2008: 324). 
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tive challenges, yet nothing I have written here suggests that those challenges 
cannot be overcome. My target in this paper is not the claim that the Kantian 
strategy can help us secure the objective validity of  our normative judgments, 
but rather the claim that it can do so and also stay clear of  metanormative 
debates about the semantics and metaphysics of  normative discourse. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
At the beginning of  The Sources of  Normativity, Korsgaard describes two dif-
ferent standards that any satisfying theory of  normative concepts must meet: 
a standard of  normative or justificatory adequacy and a standard of  explanatory 
adequacy. Korsgaard’s complaint about traditional metanormative theories is 
that they are concerned only with explanatory adequacy. They purport to ex-
plain our ethical practices from the outside, and they therefore leave the ur-
gent matter of  normative adequacy unaddressed. Consequently, they can 
provide neither comfort nor guidance to people struggling with the question 
of  what they ought to do. 
This is precisely what we should expect from traditional metanormative 
theories. Any traditional metaethicist should tell us that if  we are agonizing 
about what we ought to do or about what we have most reason to do, we 
should seek guidance not from metaethics but from normative ethics. We 
should, in other words, step inside our ethical practices and take part in the 
conversations that constitute them. After all, the question of  what we have 
reason to do is, as Korsgaard repeatedly reminds us, a normative question, not 
a metanormative one. Korsgaard is correct, then, that if  we are concerned 
with the normative or justificatory adequacy of  our ethical practices, we need 
more than traditional metaethics. We need something like her Kantian strate-
gy. 
What Korsgaard and other Kantians fail to recognize, though – and 
what I have been trying to demonstrate here – is that their strategy for show-
ing that our practices meet the standard of  normative adequacy can succeed 
only if  Kantian arguments about inescapability are coupled with the right 
sort of  metanormative theory. For it is a metanormative theory concerned 
with explanatory adequacy that tells us what we are doing when we are asking about 
the normative adequacy of  our ethical practices or are otherwise engaged in ethical 
discourse. Only with the support of  a metaethic can we be sure that those 
Kantian arguments about inescapable commitments are relevant to questions 
of  normative adequacy. If, according to our best metanormative theory, ethi-
cal judgments are essentially beliefs about something other than the structure 
of  practical thought or what follows from within the practical standpoint, 
then Kantian premises about what we inescapably value or constitutively aim 
at will be entirely beside the point. Matters of  normative adequacy will re-
main pressing, and Kantian arguments will not be able to help us address 
them. 
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Kantians should therefore be a bit less cavalier in their attitudes toward 
traditional metaethics. The success of  their strategy for securing the objectiv-
ity of  ethics hinges on a number of  metanormative outcomes. “Boring” or 
not, the quagmire of  traditional metaethics awaits. There is no Kantian route 
around it.58 
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58 For comments on earlier drafts of  this paper I am indebted to David Enoch, Matt Evans, 
Mark Schroeder, Russ Shafer-Landau, Peter Railton, Joshua Silverstein and David Velleman, 
as well as the participants in the Mid-Atlantic Reading Group in Ethics, various anonymous 
referees and the editors of  the Journal of  Ethics & Social Philosophy. Special thanks to Stephen 
Darwall and Nishi Shah for many helpful and encouraging conversations and suggestions. 
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